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BAYESIAN APPROACHES TO THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
STEPHEN CHAREST*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Precautionary Principle
In recent years, variations of the Precautionary Principle have
been adopted in international environmental agreements and by na1
tional regulatory agencies. Despite the apparent increase in its application, the Precautionary Principle remains ill-defined. Generally, it
espouses the belief that under conditions of substantial scientific uncertainty environmental regulations should err on the side of caution

* Associate, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson, New York; J.D., New York University, 2001; B.S., University of Minnesota, 1997. The views expressed here are those of the
author and should not be attributed to Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson.
1. See, e.g., The Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992 art. 3(3), 31
I.L.M. 849, 854 (1992); The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Conference
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992) ; The Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, Nov. 7,
1990, reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int’l Env’l L. 473 (1990) (Ministers and representatives of 137 countries
agree to “protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control . . . emission of
substances that deplete it . . . .”); Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle 11,27 (Feb. 2, 2000) available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/dgs/health_consumer/linrary/pub/pub07_en.pdf.; The Second International Conference on
the Protection of the North Sea, Ministerial Declaration 1 (1987) (Ministers of the EEC and eight
countries agree that the North Sea ecosystem should be protected through the reduction of
pollution “even where there is no scientific evidence to prove the causal link between emissions
and effects (‘the principle of precautionary action’).”); The Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, Part III/Add. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (“The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.”); The World Charter for Nature, U.N. GAOR, 37th Session., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/37/7 (1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983) (“Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall
demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential
adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed.”).
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in order to prevent harm.2 The Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development states that “In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”3 Advocates argue that the Precautionary Principle merely
reinforces common sense notions of environmental stewardship.4
However, opponents view it as a fundamentally unscientific rule of
decision that exploits the public’s fear of the unfamiliar and promotes
radical environmental agendas or protectionist trade policies disguised as environmental regulations.5
Advocates further argue that the application of the Precautionary Principle is justified by science’s demonstrated fallibility in antici6
pating environmental harms such as asbestosis and ozone depletion.
Additionally some potential environmental hazards cannot be quantified with certainty by existing scientific methods. Thus the Precautionary Principle would allow such harms to be regulated even if con7
clusive proof of harm has yet to be established. In this sense, the
Precautionary Principle may be viewed as a burden-shifting device
that places the responsibility of demonstrating a product’s or process’s safety on those who would introduce it, rather than a demonstra2. Id.
3. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992).
4. See Use and Abuse of the Precautionary Principle, ISIS submission to US Advisory
Committee on International Economic Policy (ACIEP) Biotech. Working Group, July 13, 2000.
5. Peter Huber, Editorial, Fear of the Future, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2000 (arguing that the
principle was “invoked to trump scientific evidence and move directly to banning things they
[environmentalists] don’t like—biotech, wireless technology, hydrocarbon emissions. In other
words, science got in their way, so they shoved it aside.”).
6. The failure of science to predict the dangers associated with a new technology or process often prevents recovery under the common law due to causation problems in the law of
torts. Cf. ANDREWS CONTINUING EDUCATION INSTITUTE, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELD
LITIGATION: THE NEXT ASBESTOS? (1993).
7. Beyond the threshold problem of whether an environmental harm poses a threat at all,
conventional environmental regulatory mechanisms which rely on assessing the costs of an environmental harm may be ineffective if there is uncertainty regarding how those costs will develop
over time. See WORKING GROUP II TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATIONS AND MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL ANALYSES
78 (Robert T. Watson et al., eds., 1996) at 5. Thus, even where price reflects environmental
costs, if those costs are unlikely to increase in a predictable, linear fashion, the market may undervalue the impacts of additional production and fail to allocate resources appropriately.
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tion of harm on those who would regulate it.8 In this vein, some
commentators view the Precautionary Principle as a particular policy
application of a more general “safety principle,” in which people are
allowed to weigh harms that they find particularly dreadful more
heavily than would be the case under traditional cost-benefit methods.9 However, environmental regulations entail real costs, both in
terms of foregone social benefits and—in a world of limited regulatory resources—foregone environmental protections.10 Thus, because
of these unintended negative consequences, the Precautionary Principle is vulnerable to criticisms directed against those who would take it
11
too far.
The distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity, or what will
be referred to in this paper as true uncertainty is important to under12
standing the scope of the Precautionary Principle. Uncertainty generally refers to situations in which a harm is probabilistic in nature,
but for which a probability distribution is known or may be assigned.13
True uncertainty refers to situations in which even the probability of

8. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 934
(1998) (“[T]he precautionary principle switches the burden of scientific proof necessary for triggering policy responses from those who support prohibiting or reducing a potentially offending
activity to those who wants to continue.”)
9. Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters
More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that such a safety principle is consistent
with a modified cost-benefit analysis) available at http://www.nyu.edu/pages/lawreview/76/1/
geistfeld.html.
10. See, e.g., John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in
RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (John D.
Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds., 1995); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 12-13, 22-23 (1993); Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risk, 86 COLUM. L.REV. 495 (1986). See generally PAUL R. PORTNEY,
ECONOMICS AND THE CLEAN AIR ACT, reprinted in 136 Cong. Rec. H12911.01, *H12916 (Oct.
26, 1990) (discussing a macroeconomic approach to assessing costs of environmental regulation,) Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE Ch. 12 (1997) (discussing
“health-health tradeoffs”).
11. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE
L., REV. 851 (1996) (discussing the legal problems associated with the precautionary principle
and its unintended consequences).
12. See Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post Keynesian
Perspective, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 129, 130-31 (discussing the “objective probability environment”).
13. Stochastic risks are those for which a reliable probability distribution is available but
there is uncertainty about the results in each particular instance. See generally K. RADFORD,
MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 64-65, 78 (1975).
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harm is not known.14 It is this latter situation with which advocates of
the Precautionary Principle are primarily concerned.15 An example of
an uncertain harm might be the probability of a product malfunctioning, especially if that product is subject to testing. Several trials
may be performed, to determine the frequency with which a malfunction will occur, which in turn may be used to formulate a probability
distribution. Truly uncertain harms often arise when controlled testing is impossible and there is no experience from which to construct a
probability distribution. Unfortunately, this is precisely the type of
uncertainty—true uncertainty—which is characteristic of many environmental problems. It would be highly impractical, for example, to
try to construct a controlled experiment for global warming.
B. Statistical Analysis of Risks in the Regulatory Context
In determining environmental policies, regulators must make decisions about the desired level of protection from a perceived risk, an
16
inherently precautionary action. Even in the face of true uncertainty
regulatory priorities must be set due to limited economic and en17
For example, regulations for truly uncertain
forcement budgets.
risks might usurp scarce resources that could more effectively be allocated to regulating known risks. Thus, the uncritical application of
the Precautionary Principle could cause a result similar to a regulatory Gresham’s Law.18 Regulations for truly uncertain risks might
14. See Davidson, supra note 12, at 131 (discussing the “true uncertainty environment,” in
which the decision-maker believes that unforeseeable changes will dictate future outcomes and
that no reliable estimate of probabilities can be made).
15. See, e.g., Rachel Clark, Dealing With Uncertainty, RACHEL’S ENVIRONMENT &
HEALTH WEEKLY, Sept. 5, 1996, available at http://www.dieoff.org/page31.htm.
16. Admittedly, most people are unfamiliar with the basic conceptual framework of statistics and decision theory; it might be argued that analyzing behavior using such stylized models is
highly unrealistic. But even in areas such as the law of evidence, in which people tend to evaluate new information in a fairly informal way, legal scholars have begun to apply the lessons of
Bayesian statistics with interesting results. Richard Posner wrote that Bayes’ Theorem offers
“the most influential model of rational decision-making under conditions of ineradicable uncertainty[.]” Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1479 (1999). But see Richard D. Friedman, Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even
Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873 (1999) (criticizing some of Posner’s starting assumptions).
17. See John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against
Risk at Less Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13 (1997) (arguing that priority setting is a necessary
part of environmental regulation, even when it’s done implicitly).
18. See Richard B. Stewart, Implementing the Precautionary Principle (1999) at
http://www.cserge.ucl.ac.uk/Stewart.pdf. Gresham’s Law is commonly understood to suggest
that “bad money drives out good”; in other words, too much concern with improbable risks consumes resources that could better be applied to the regulation of harms with a higher probabil-
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usurp scarce resources that could more effectively be allocated to
regulating known risks.19 Indeed, part of the visceral appeal of the
Precautionary Principle might be that it is consistent with the tendency of people to assume familiar risks (e.g., smoking causing lung
cancer) over unfamiliar risks (e.g., cell phone use causing brain can20
cer) even if the former pose a greater threat.
Statistical analysis is the means by which regulators are informed
about the degree or ‘magnitude of harm’ of a risk. The most common
methods are the Classical “frequentist” approach or the Bayesian approach. The differences in these approaches are further explored in
Part II.A of this paper. Regulators generally acknowledge that a Bayesian approach is a more sensible method than a classical approach
when performing a cost-benefit analysis for a risk with a known prob21
ability distribution; an “uncertain” risk. When dealing with a truly
uncertain risk in which there is substantial disagreement among experts about the probability or magnitude of harm of such a risk,
regulators must decide what view to take of the probability of harm in
their analysis.22 That is, a regulator must make an informed assumpity—that bad regulation (which can include good regulation of improbable harms) drives out
good regulation.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, Risk Assessment and
Risk Management in Regulatory Decision-Making, Draft Report for Public Review and Comment, at 45 (“The public-health consequences of exposing patients and workers to ionizing radiation and of exposing the general population to infectious agents are so well established that
they might be in the category of “familiar” risks, which psychologists have shown are far less
frightening to the general public than “unfamiliar” or “dreaded” risks, even when the estimated
magnitudes of the former are much higher.”).
21. A number of environmental regulations require regulators to use cost-benefit analysis
in conjunction with some sort of subjective assessments of the risk of harm—which might be
termed a Bayesian approach. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22. (1983). providing that: “When an
agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects on the human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is incomplete or unavailable information
the agency shall always make clear that such information is lacking.
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the overall costs
of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the information in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts
cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the
means to obtain it are not, the agency shall include within the environmental impact
statement (1) a statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable [and] (2)
a statement of the relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts to the human environment..
22. See SEAS AT RISK, The Final Declaration of the First European SEAS AT RISK Conference (1994) (herinafter Seas at Risk Declaration), synopsis available at http://www.coastal
guide.org/code/direct/html, document available at the Common Wadden Sea Secretariat, Vir-

CHAREST.DOC

270

09/11/02 1:15 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. 12:265

tion about the probability of harm. Some advocates of the Precautionary Principle argue that regulators should adopt a “worst case
scenario” view in making this assumption to determine the probability distribution of harm.23 Others argue that regulators should use a
“best-guess” Bayesian distribution,24 and proceed in much the same
way as would be adopted in the case of a risk with a known probabil25
ity. Thus, even under a generally precautionary approach to regulation, one might distinguish between different levels of caution: a
“strong” Precautionary Principle under a “worst case” view and a
“less strong” Precautionary Principle under a “best guess” view.
C. Methodological Advantages of a Bayesian Approach
In order to retain its credibility as a legitimate principle of environmental policymaking and not degenerate into an instrument of
veiled protectionism, the Precautionary Principle must be implemented in a way that is as transparent as possible, does not deter further research and information gathering, and characterizes risk in a
way amenable to regulatory decision-making and ongoing scientific
debate. This paper argues that a Bayesian approach is not only the
appropriate method to assess truly uncertain risks, but that it is
uniquely suited to promoting intellectual due process principles. The
latter characteristic is an important counterargument to the criticism
that the Precautionary Principle is a fundamentally “unscientific” de26
cision rule.
Part II.A explains the theory behind Bayesian analysis and provides a mathematical example employing the methodology. Part II.B
compares the Bayesian Approach with the Classical approach in risk
assessment highlighting features of the Bayesian analysis which make
it a superior risk assessment tool under conditions of substantial scichowstrabe 1, D-26382 Wilhelmshaven, Germany (articulating assumption of a “worst case
view” when applying the Precautionary Principle) The Final Declaration of the First European
SEAS AT RISK Conference, Seas at Risk, Drieharingstraat 25, 3511 BH Utrecht, The Netherlands, Seas at Risk, 36 –SC (1995) (herinafter Seas at Risk Declaration).
23. Id.
24. See CHARLES A. HOLLOWAY, DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: MODELS
AND CHOICES (1979) (presenting a compelling technical case in favor of such a “best estimate”
approach).
25. See STEVEN MILLOY, CHOICES IN RISK ASSESSMENT - THE ROLE OF SCIENCE POLICY
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS, i, xiii (1994) (discussing “best guess”
approach, some of its assumptions and its relationship to the assumptions in risk assessment).
26. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 851 (1996).
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entific uncertainty and disagreement among experts. Particular attention is paid to how the transparent nature of the Bayesian approach
adds to its legitimacy. Also, Bayesian techniques’ consistency with
intuitive ideas of how to approach risk creates a more appropriate division of power between experts and non-experts in environmental
policymaking, thereby promoting democratic considerations that are
sometimes put forth as a justification for the Precautionary Principle.
Part II.C explores how a Bayesian approach is consistent with the
well-established scientific principles of falsifiability and simplicity.
Therefore, casting environmental risks in Bayesian terms offers many
advantages in framing scientific controversies in a way that promotes
ongoing debate and is subject to scientific scrutiny. As will be discussed, however, institutional pressures might exist in opposition to
the widespread use of Bayesian techniques.
The Bayesian approach is not a panacea, however, and Part III.
discusses some issues that should be kept in mind when applying
Bayesian methods to the Precautionary Principle. Perhaps most significantly, policymakers’ conclusions will often be a function of the
prior beliefs they adopt regarding the risk of an environmental harm.
A simple example is used to illustrate a situation in which two groups
engaged in negotiation over the extent of an environmental harm
might never reach an agreement. While the degree of harm is resolvable from an objective perspective, the groups’ stalemate is a result of each group adopting inappropriately extreme initial positions
combined with factors of overconfidence and a tendency to underestimate the value of further information gathering. This is particularly
interesting since the scientific opinions of experts from different disciplines over risks such as the extent of global warming have failed to
converge—and in fact have in some cases diverged further—even as
these experts are exposed to a common set of new data.27 The persistence of such disagreements are examined from a Bayesian perspective, and possible solutions are suggested. Ultimately, however, even
these sometimes perverse results that can arise when two groups
adopt different belief functions will be mitigated to some extent by
the Bayesian requirement of a choice of prior beliefs which explicitly
quantifies the assumptions that go into making a regulatory decision—explicit assumptions about prior beliefs that can themselves be

27. See ROGER M. COOKE, EXPERTS IN UNCERTAINTY: OPINION AND SUBJECTIVE
PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE (1991).
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scrutinized and might mitigate any temptation to adopt inappropriately extreme positions.
II. THE MERITS OF BAYESIAN APPROACH
A. Background
28
Bayes’ Theorem is an extremely important development in the
history of social science, as well as a somewhat controversial area
29
within statistics. Bayes’ original theory states that “the probability
of an event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the
value of the thing expected upon its happening.”30 The Theorem
therefore provides a way to combine prior information, or a prior belief about a risk or a population parameter with new information obtained through sampling or other experiments to guide a person’s inferences in a rational way. It allows decision and game theorists to
examine how rational actors would assimilate new information with
their existing subjective beliefs.
Its appeal to statisticians and social scientists is that its rules conform to mathematical principles that reflect a certain amount of in31
ternal consistency. The basic idea is that a person should not accept
wholesale the results of new information that disconfirm their prior
beliefs. The weight assigned to the new data versus the prior beliefs
depends upon the person’s degree of confidence in both their beliefs
and the sampled data, which is graphically reflected in how “tightly”
the probability distribution is centered around certain values.

28. The Theorem was first proposed by an English theologian and mathematician by the
name of Thomas Bayes, in a 1763 essay which was posthumously published in 1964 and titled
Bayes, T. (1764) An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London 53:370-418. Reprinted in facsimile in W.E.
Deming, ed.,Facsimiles of Two papers by Bayes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
1940).
29. See generally William H. Jefferys & James O. Berger, Sharpening Ockham’s Razor on a
Bayesian Strop, Purdue University Technical Report #91-44C (August 1991) available at http://
quasar.as.utexas.edu/Papers.html. Later published in edited form in 89 AMERICAN SCIENTIST,
Jan-Feb. 1992 64-72.
30. Will Hively, The Mathematics of Making Up Your Mind, DISCOVER, May 1996, at 9394.
31. Consistent in the everyday sense, meaning in harmony, as opposed to the technical
term used in Bayesian statistics.
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Mathematical Definition and Example
In technical terms, Bayes’ Theorem states that the subjective
posterior odds (odds after being exposed to new data)32 that a hypothesis is true can be determined by multiplying the prior odds (or
odds before exposure to the new data)33 by the ratio of (1) the probability that the data would have been observed if the hypothesis were
true to (2) the probability that the data would have been observed if
the hypothesis were not true. The ratio of (1) to (2) above is referred
to as the likelihood ratio.34 So, using L to represent this likelihood ratio, Bayes’ Theorem is
P(hypothesis is true after) = P(hypothesis is true before) x L.

Alternatively, since the probability of obtaining the data and the parameters can be written as:
P(data and parameters) = P(data parameters) x P(parameters)

Or:
P(data and parameters) = P(parameters data) x P(data).

Equating these expressions and rearranging gives us Bayes’ Theorem:
P(parameters data) = [P(data parameters) x P(parameters)] / P(data).

35

In this case, the prior hypothesis is the probability of the parameters
prior to being exposed to the data.
In practice, consider two groups, A and B, who are trying to anticipate the magnitude of a truly uncertain environmental harm. This
will eventually be a real number, of course, but because of their uncertainty the best that A and B can do is assign a prior subjective
probability distribution. The prior subjective probability distribution
assigned by A and B is based on their current beliefs, given every-

32. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Presumption of Innocence, Not of Even Odds, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 873, 875 (2000) (defining the posterior as “the odds that the proposition is true as assessed after receipt of the new evidence”).
33. Id. (describing the prior as “the odds as assessed before receipt of the new evidence”).
34. Id. (“Simply defined, the likelihood ratio of a given body of evidence with respect to a
given proposition is the ratio of the probability that the evidence would arise given that the
proposition is true to the probability that the evidence would arise given that the proposition is
false.”).
35. PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 217 (4th ed. 1998).
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thing they know about the harm.36 This is their ‘subjective prior belief.’ For this example, let us use the bell-shaped curve of a normal
37
distribution. Assume that A and B will be able to reach an agreement on a regulation if the magnitude of harm lies somewhere between 1.8 and 2.2 million. This is the hypothesis for which they are
testing. Further assume that A initially thinks that there is a 15%
chance that the number lies between 1.8 and 2.2 million. This is a
function of his prior beliefs. When A receives new information regarding the environmental harm, her belief about the magnitude of
environmental harm will likely change. Bayes’ Theorem tells us that
her posterior belief that the hypothesis (in this case, that the magnitude of harm lies between 1.8 and 2.2 million) will be determined by
multiplying her prior odds that it was true (15%) by the likelihood ratio. To determine the likelihood ratio, A asks herself two questions.
First, what are the chances I would have encountered the results I did
in the sample if my hypothesis (again, that the value lies between 1.8
and 2.2 million) were true? Second, what are the chances I would
have received the results I did if my hypothesis were not true? The
ratio of the odds in the first question to the odds in the second question forms the likelihood ratio. If her answer to the first question is
twenty percent chance (0.2) and her answer to the second were eighty
percent chance (0.8), her likelihood ratio would be 0.2/0.8, or 0.25.
Therefore A’s posterior belief that the hypothesis is true is: 0.15 x 0.25
or 0.0375.38
B. Bayesian Versus Classical Approaches
As mentioned before, the classical or frequentist methodology is
another statistical approach to determining the probability of harm of

36. A prior distribution represents the Bayesian actor’s subjective probability distribution
or beliefs prior to exposure to new information. See generally D.H. Kaye, What is Bayesianism?,
in PROBABILITY AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF
BAYESIANISM 1 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988) (discussing Bayesian terminology).
37. Bayesian statistics applies to other families of probability distributions as well, but this
paper will only discuss normal (symmetrical, bell-shaped) probability distributions. A normal
distribution is a bell-shaped probability curve with a probability density function f(z) = 1 / (2Π)1/2
exp (-1/2 z2). See generally BERNARD W. LINDGREN, STATISTICAL THEORY, 178-80 (4th ed.
1993).
38. Although a regulator might interpret the 0.0375 figure as being strong evidence against
the hypothesis, it must be emphasized that this cannot be interpreted as the probability of the
hypothesis being true. The likelihood ratios represent the ratios of the probabilities of the data
being observed assuming the truth of the hypotheses, but the classical method does not give any
way to relate this figure to the probability of the hypothesis itself being true.
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an environmental risk. Classical statisticians are sometimes called
frequentists because they view probabilities as representing the frequency with which something occurs. Classical or frequentist statisticians perform hypothesis tests by assuming the null hypothesis to be
true, and then asking with what probability these results could occur
by chance given that the hypothesis were true. A low probability of the
results occurring by chance, which is measured by the p-value, is generally taken as evidence to refute the null hypothesis,39 but it does not
always correspond well to what one would consider the probability of
harm. The frequentist perspective is not compatible with the Bayesian view of probabilities as representing subjective beliefs, since the
frequentists would argue that either the hypothesis is true or it is not
40
true.
The choice between classical and Bayesian methods is not a trivial one. Consider a hypothetical example put forward by James
Berger in which clinical trials are being performed to determine
41
The
whether a series of drugs are more effective than a placebo.
null hypothesis, that the drug is no more effective than the placebo, is
known to be true in about half the cases based on past experience.42
After testing twelve drugs, two have p-values of about 0.05 and two
have p-values of about 0.01.43 The resulting p-values for these four
drugs strongly suggest that the drug is more effective than the placebo, thereby refuting the null hypothesis.44 But using robust Bayesian analysis techniques, Berger demonstrates that the lower bounds
for the percentage of drugs with p-values of 0.05 that are actually ineffective is 24% and the lower bound for the 0.01 group would be about
7%; the actual values (remembering that the robust Bayesian techniques gives lower bounds) being about 50% and 15% respectively.45
As Bayesians are fond of saying, p-values give the right answers to
the wrong questions. When classical statisticians try to bridge the gap
between this right answer to the wrong question (the probability of
39. See David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 331, 378-79 (Federal Judicial Center 1994).
40. Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29.
41. See James Berger, An Overview of Robust Bayesian Analysis, Purdue University Technical Report #93-53C (1993), available at http://www.isds.duke.edu/~berger/papers/overview.
html.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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observing the data assuming the hypothesis is true) to the right question (whether or not the hypothesis is actually true) in the regulatory
context, they will often give the wrong advice if not the wrong answer
in a narrow sense.
This disconnect between p-values and posterior probabilities of
ineffectiveness demonstrates the dangers of ignoring Bayesian techniques. In the context of the Precautionary Principle, classical methods might dramatically mischaracterize risks that a Bayesian approach, or at least a Bayesian robustness analysis in conjunction with
classical tests – would reveal.
Classical hypothesis testing may be used to guide policy decisions
in some cases, however it is not always useful in cases where there is
an unknown risk. For example, in the context of Genetically Modified Organisms, regulators may want to know the probability that a
46
particular foodstuff will pose health risks of a certain magnitude.
Because this is an unknown risk, for which there are no existing objective frequencies, classical statistics is unable to assign a probability
to this proposition.47 Bayesian statistics can assign such a probability
through the use of prior subjective beliefs. Thus, the Bayesian approach is more useful in directly addressing questions about which
regulators are concerned. Yet many argue that in the face of true un48
certainty, a Bayesian approach should be abandoned since any attempt to quantify risks that are unknown seems rather arbitrary.49
46. See generally Graham, supra note 17 (comparing classical with Bayesian approaches in
environmental regulation).
47. See Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29 (discussing the philosophical differences between
classical and Bayesian statisticians).
48. See, e.g., Rachel Clark, Dealing With Uncertainty, RACHEL’S ENVIRONMENT &
HEALTH WEEKLY, Sept. 5, 1996, available at http://www.dieoff.org/page31.htm.
49. One approach to addressing a truly unknown risk that might seem less arbitrary on its
face would be to weigh the probability of each possible outcome equally. This is problematic
for several reasons. First, such an approach to risk assessment is vulnerable to how the question
is framed. For example, in the role of a die one event might be that the numbers are 1 or 2, with
the second event being that the numbers rolled are 3, 4, 5, or 6. If a 1 or a 2 is the event being
tested for, the problems associated with assigning equally weights to the hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis become clear. Also, it is unclear how one would deal with an event situation with an infinite tail, a tail in which some small probability extends out forever, or there are
an infinite number of outcomes. This can happen when the possible outcomes include all real
numbers, or even line on a continuous interval of real numbers. While these problems might
seem self-evident, Richard Posner’s otherwise interesting paper on a Bayesian approach to the
law of evidence was criticized on this basis in a recent article. Because weighing the risks equally
is influenced by how the question is framed. In the role of a die, it might be natural to weigh
each number 1-6 evenly, because we happen to know that that is the case. But if we didn't know
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Decisions ultimately must be made, however, and in the absence of
some formal risk assessment method other rules of thumb will likely
be adopted, such as the worst case "strong" precautionary principle
approach discussed earlier, with all its shortcomings.
However, given that environmental policy decision-makers must
still decide whether to act in the face of true uncertainty, and that
classical statistics is unable to address unknown risks, abandoning
Bayesian approaches does not make sense. Only under a “strong”
version of the Precautionary Principle, where a perceived risk is
regulated until it is proved harmless, could regulators act prior to
quantifying the magnitude of the risk. However, the “strong” version
is unlikely to be adopted not only because of budgetary constraints
but also because the (overly) precautionary regulations could prevent
50
benefits from being realized. Thus, without either Bayesian or classical statistics, or an extremely preventative regulatory regime, it is
likely that regulators will turn to other, perhaps less formal methods
to assess the risk of a truly uncertain harm. A more informal method
of risk assessment might be adopted, for example, in which regulators
deliberate with experts as to the degree of risk. However, this deliberation method does not avoid the arbitrary assumptions associated
with assigning a Bayesian probability distribution to a truly unknown
risk. Instead, regulators may simply substitute another set of lessexplicit assumptions and biases based on expert opinions.51
Transparency, and the Division of Power Between Experts and
Non-experts
One of the arguments put forward in favor of the Precautionary
Principle is a democratic ideal that people should be able to weigh
52
more heavily risks that they consider particularly odious or dreadful.
This view requires that regulators, who presumably take the polity’s
interests into account, properly weigh various risks in their decisionthis, we might define event 1 as the die coming up 1 and the event 2 as the die coming up 2-6.
The probabilities would be completely a function of how we define the events.
50. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, January 29, 2000, arts. 10.6, 11.8., available at http://www.unep.ch/biosafety/cartagena-protocolen.pdf (adopting a relatively strong version of the Precautionary Principle). See also John H.
Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and Proposed International
Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 173 (2000) (analyzing problems associated with an overly
precautionary approach).
51. See Berger, supra note 41.
52. See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1996).
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making and prioritization. While expert opinion will often be necessary to guide these regulations and give them credibility,53 ideally
54
normative judgments should be left to regulators. Thus, the role of
the expert should be to present regulatory decision-makers with the
probabilities and magnitudes of the risks that are to be regulated and
allow the regulator to decide how to regulate based on the public’s
will.55
The Bayesian approach is more responsive to these democratic
concerns in two ways. First, as alluded to earlier, the Bayesian approach is more transparent. Bayesian analysis requires an explicit assignment of a subjective probability prior to exposure to new information. This differs greatly from classical statistics where experts
make assumptions regarding the risk in the course of the hypothesis
testing. Thus, the assumptions are effectively hidden from the decision-maker, although they should be recorded in the statistical report.
Also, the Bayesian approach frames the regulator’s question about a
perceived risk in the way in which most people intuitively think of
risk assessment. Bayesian statisticians ask what is the probability of
harm, whereas classical statisticians ask what the probability is that a
set of data would occur by chance if a particular hypothesis were assumed to be true. Bayesian assumptions are explicitly made at the
beginning of the process of formulating prior beliefs. As a result, this
method reduces the gap between the results obtained and their regulatory interpretation. By contrast, the classical approach requires a
much larger interpretive role in bridging the gap between the results
and their regulatory implications, and includes assumptions that may
be subtler but which are just as significant.
Second, the Bayesian approach decreases the reliance on experts
in the regulatory process thereby alleviating concerns that experts
might inappropriately influence the regulator decision-making process with their personal beliefs. The Bayesian approach allows the decision-maker, who is responsible for expressing the polity’s will, to as53. See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS
POLICYMAKERS (1990).
54. This view isn’t universally accepted, however, and “rule by experts” isn’t a bad characterization of the development of the regulatory state in post-War America. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civil Republican Justification for the Administrative State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1516, 1518
(1992) (“[T]he New Deal contemplated that Congress should identify an area in need of regulatory control and turn the expert agency loose to regulate.”).
55. At least if one accepts that normative judgments should be decided in a more democratic fashion.
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sign a subjective probability to a perceived risk, which reflects his uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the risk.56 As we have seen, classical methods do not allow this. Assigning a probability to a population parameter makes no sense to a classical statistician, because to
him probabilities reflect objective frequencies rather than subjective
57
beliefs. Therefore, instead of presenting the regulatory authorities
with the probabilities they need in order to institute environmental
regulations, it is likely that an expert using classical statistical methods will require a far more active role in what will likely be a deliberative, collective decision. While such a process might have its virtues,
it does offer far more opportunity for experts to use their superior
knowledge to impose their own biases in the decision-making process.58
Adopting a Bayesian approach in a regulatory context would
likely lead to greater accountability on the part of experts who would
have to commit to actual assessments of risk that are testable through
subsequent experience and subject to peer review. After all, even assuming the expert is disinterested, it seems unreasonable to expect
him to internalize the many conflicting societal interests and opinions
that may guide him to some sort of opinion. A far more sensible approach would be to limit the expert’s role to his area of technical
competence, with the expert serving as a guide for popular will rather
than the instrument of its expression.
Greater transparency in risk assessment benefits the implementation of the Precautionary Principle. As has been suggested, there are
democratic concerns that experts might not fully represent the inter59
ests of the polity. Experts focusing on the quantitative aspects of an
environmental harm might undervalue outcomes that people particularly dread from a qualitative perspective. Also, it is not unreasonable to imagine that experts, particularly in the environmental
field, are to some extent self-selecting, motivated by personal passions that do not necessarily reflect popular will in terms of risk tolerance and other factors. Transparency in the regulatory process may
also hedge against claims that the Precautionary Principle is being
employed as a trade protectionist measure. As the issue has been
56. See Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29, at 12.
57. Id.
58. See UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 11117 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (summarizing the studies on expert bias).
59. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 52.
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framed here, adoption of Bayesian techniques would entail increased
accountability and diminished influence for experts, thus some resistance to adopting Bayesian methods may be encountered. Since experts generally decide what methods they will use in making risk assessments, it seems unlikely that they would spontaneously adopt
such techniques in the absence of external pressures. By adopting an
overly deferential view of expert opinion for fear of overstepping
their institutional competences, courts and tribunals may be deferring
to experts not just on purely technical questions, but also on a range
of judgments that are actually more properly left to the courts and
other institutions.
C. Bayesian Techniques and Intellectual Due Process Considerations
In implementing and applying the Precautionary Principle, administrative agencies and tribunals will be called upon to decide
among several competing hypotheses that purport to explain a set of
data. Although some administrative law scholars, such as Stephen
60
Breyer, have at times seemed to advocate using the hypothesis that
enjoys the greatest degree of acceptance within the scientific community,61 courts have been understandably concerned about overstepping
their institutional competencies in judging the validity of rival scien62
tific hypotheses. Stepping outside the area of administrative and
regulatory law for a moment, the line of cases following Daubert, for
example, allows even minority scientific opinions to be considered as
evidence so long as they enjoy some degree of acceptance within the
scientific community.63 Particularly in the context of the Precaution60. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 12-13 (1993).
61. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (articulating the “general acceptance” standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence as “while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
62. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-601 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the judge
some gatekeeping responsibility . . . . But I do not think it imposes on them either the obligation
or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform that role.”). See also RuizTroche v. Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Daubert neither requires nor empowers
trial courts to determine which of several competing scientific theories has the best provenance.”).
63. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating
that methods used by “a recognized minority of scientists in their field” still could be acceptable).
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ary Principle, legal scholars have sometimes advocated using the hypothesis that adopts the worst-case scenario view in determining
64
remedies. Recent literature on the relationship between Bayesian
techniques and the scientific method, however, suggests that Bayesian
techniques may provide a framework to assist regulators’ choices of
models, and may actually illuminate the way towards a more objective standard for judging rival scientific hypotheses.65 The renowned
Austrian philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper argued that falsifiability was the quality that distinguished genuinely scientific theories
from pseudo-science.66 Although widely accepted among philosophers of science and scientific practitioners alike,67 the practical application of this standard to the courtroom has perplexed as formidable
a jurist as Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who wrote in regard to his
fellow federal judges that “I am at a loss to know what is meant when
it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its ‘falsifi68
ability,’ and I suspect some of them will be, too.” In general terms,
falsifiability means that a hypothesis makes assertions that can disprove, or at least disconfirm, the hypothesis if they fail to come about,
making it vulnerable to testing.69 A classic example of claims that lack
falsifiability are psychics and other paranormalists who claim that the
skepticism of researchers or the artificiality of laboratory conditions
limit their ability to exercise their “gifts.” That being the case, there
is no way to test the hypothesis that a psychic’s ability is not genuine
without interference; the claim can not be disproved. Another example of a lack of falsifiability are disciplines whose hypotheses have
64. See, e.g., Chris W. Backes & Jonathan M. Verschuuren, The Precautionary Principle in
International, European, and Dutch Wildlife Law, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVT’L L & POL’Y 43, 56
(1998) (interpreting the Precautionary Principle such that a severe enough “worst-case” scenario justifies prohibition of an activity).
65. See generally Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29.
66. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 279 (rev. ed. 1992) (arguing that falsifiability was the quality that distinguished genuinely scientific theories from
dogmatic, non-scientific views not subject to constant testing and revision). See also Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593 (citing Popper’s view of falsifiability in the scientific evidence context).
67. See generally IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING (1983) (assessing
Popper’s influence on the philosophy and practice of science).
68. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-601 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although Daubert did not deal with a regulatory decision, it is not unreasonable to think that
regulatory decision-makers might adopt many of the same standards in judging the relative
merits of rival scientific hypotheses in regulatory matters as have been adopted under the common law.
69. See Popper, supra note 66, at 42 (The principle of falsification is distinguished by “its
manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested.”).
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such vague predictive power that virtually any data can be interpreted
as being consistent with those claims. Such a discipline is astrology,
70
where nearly any event could fulfill a horoscope. Popper himself included the disciples of Freud and Marx in this category as well.71
In 1991, James Berger and William Jefferys wrote a paper on the
relationship between Bayesian techniques and Ockham’s Razor—the
scientific principle which asserts that the simpler hypothesis is usually
72
the better. In the paper, they compared the ability of two rival hypotheses (Einstein’s theory of general relativity and a “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis) to explain observed perturbations in the orbit of
Mercury around the sun in about 1920.73 The discussion of this example demonstrates not only Bayesianism’s close relationship to Ockham’s Razor, but also to more general principles of falsifiability.74
In order to compare the relative likelihood that the rival hypotheses (“E” for Einstein’s, “F” for the “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis) explained the data that had actually been observed, Berger
and Jefferys compared the ratio of the probability that the data would
be observed if the Einstein hypothesis were true to the probability
that the data would be observed given that the “fudged Newtonian”
75
hypothesis were true (this ratio is noted as “B”). They then made
some other fairly weak assumptions,76 with the end result being that
70. See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 34, 37-38 (1962).
71. See Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United
States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 165 (1997) (citing that Popper sought to distinguish empirical science from what he viewed as the pseudoscientific excesses of Karl Marx’s economic theories and much of Freudian psychology).
72. See Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29. (“Ockham’s Razor, an established principle used
every day in science, has deep connections with Bayesian reasoning, which traces directly back
to Sir Harold Jeffreys’ pioneering work on statistics during the 1920s and 30s.”).
73. See id at 5-8.
74. See notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
75. See Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29. They represent Bayes’ factor (B) as (with (a) as
the observed data; (E) for Einstein’s hypothesis, (F) for the Fudged Newtonian” hypothesis): B
= P(a |E) : P(a |F). Jefferys and Berger assume that the error is normal, so the probability of
observing data a given that the true value is can be written P(a| ) = 1/((2 )½ ) exp (-(a- )2/2 2).
76. Since Einstein’s theory predicted a value for = E = 42.9”, Jefferys and Berger simply
substituted 42.9 for , giving
P(a | E) = 1/((2 )½ ) exp (-(a-42.9)2/2 2)
as the probability of observing the data a assuming the Einstein hypothesis to be correct.
In order to estimate the probability of observing the data under the “fudged Newtonian”
hypothesis F, Jefferys and Berger made some additional assumptions. As they pointed out in
their paper, if a prior density for the true value of under F could be determined (represented
as P( |F)), the conditional density of the data under F would be
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the Einstein hypothesis was about 28 times as likely an explanation of
the perturbations as the “fudged Newtonian” explanation.
In this example, however, even though the Einstein hypothesis
was 28 times as probable an explanation of the data as the “fudged
Newtonian” hypothesis, virtually none of this is attributable to the
fact that one model more accurately explained the data than the
77
other. The exponential factors in the equation of the Bayes’ factor
represent the respective fit of the Einstein hypothesis to the data (DE)
and the “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis, both of which approximately equal 1.78 Instead, virtually the entire value of B which accounts for the greater probability assigned to Einstein’s hypothesis
½
can be attributed to the factor (1 + ) , which represents the ratio of
the spread of the prior distribution for the “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis to the spread of the data.79 The size of this factor, the Ockham factor,80 reflects the fact that the “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis
must spread its prior probabilities over a large number of values that

P(a | F) =  P(a | ) P( | F)d .
Jefferys and Berger chose the value of P( |F) to be a normal distribution centered around 0,
represented as
P( | F) = 1/((2 )½ exp {- ½/2 ½}.
This assumption was motivated by a number of factors. First, it was necessary that the value of
P( |F) be independent of the data, and only reflect information known about F. Jefferys and
Berger made the rather weak assumptions that smaller deviations would be more common than
larger ones and the distribution would be symmetrical (since positive or negative variations
were equally likely), so a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation , which for
various reasons they estimate to be around 50 ( =50).
Incorporating these values and assumptions into P(a|F) =  P(a| ) P( |F)d , the conditional
density of P(a|F) was determined to be
P(a | F)=1/[2 ( 2 + 2)] exp (- a2 / 2( 2 + 2)).
Plugging in the values a = 41.6, = 2.0, and = 50, the relative probability of observing the data
given the truth of the Einstein hypothesis compared to the probability of observing the data if
the “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis were true can be given by
B = P(a | F)/P(a | E) = (1 + ´2)½exp(-DE2/2)exp[DF2/2(1 + ´2)].
In this case, DE = (a - E) / = -0.65, DF = a/ = 20.8, and ´ = / = 25.0. When all the numbers
are plugged in we get the value
B = 28.6.
This means that under the rather weak assumptions made, the Einstein hypothesis is over 28
times as likely an explanation of the data compared to the “fudged Newtonian” hypothesis.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id. at 8.
79. Id. at 8.
80. See S. Gull, Bayesian Inductive Reference and Maximum Entropy, in 1 MAXIMUM
ENTROPY AND BAYESIAN METHODS IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, at 53-74 (C.J. Erickson
and C.R. Smith eds., 1988).
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are actually never observed, compared to the rather sharp predictions
of the Einstein model.81
It is the ability of the Bayesian method to make sharper predictions that relates to falsifiability. Even though both the Einstein and
82
“fudged Newtonian” models fit the data about equally well, the additional free parameters and the resulting extra degrees of freedom83
in the fudged Newtonian models serve as a double-edged sword. In
order to accommodate such a large range of possible values, which
could be observed and still be consistent with the hypothesis, the
fudged Newtonian model must spread its prior distribution over this
84
range of values thereby decreasing its predictive sharpness. Essentially the Newtonian model attempts to “hedge it bets” through a dispersed prior distribution and additional degrees of freedom.85
Like the palm-reader whose overly vague predictions can accommodate a wide range of possible outcomes, the Newtonian hypothesis fails to make the sharp predictions of the simpler Einstein
hypothesis, also making it difficult to disconfirm. The Bayesian
86
method properly penalizes the Newton hypothesis for this “hedge,”
consistent with principles of falsifiability. The fudged Newtonian hypothesis loses out not because it is more false, but because it is less
falsifiable. It is in this sense that the Bayesian method gives form to
and in some sense quantifies the principle of falsifiability.

81. Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29, at 8.
82. Id. at 8. Additional degrees of freedom make a model less ‘simple.’
83. Degrees of freedom represent the number of linearly independent observations used in
order to calculate a statistic. PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS at 65, (4th ed.
1998). A model with fewer parameters has a smaller degree of freedom, and is therefore simpler. A line, for example, has fewer parameters than a parabola. But because the parabola can
"bend", and a line is really just a kind of parabola that happens to be straight, the parabola will
always fit a scatter plot at least as well as the line. The idea of Ockham's razor is that goodness
of fit is not the only criteria of what makes a model good, and that there must be a tradeoff between fit and simplicity. Models are meant to reflect reality, not data. Since there is usually
some degree of observation error, making an excessively complicated model that bends to exactly fit the data would be mistaking the observation error in the data for the actual underlying
phenomenon that is meant to be modeled. Although in this example the Bayesian approach
penalizes the more complicated model, in the case of nested models, such as the line and parabola (nested in the sense that a line is a type of parabola), the posterior probabilities will always
favor the more complicated model. See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
(1959).
84. Jefferys & Berger, supra note 29, at 8.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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III. DRAWBACKS OF THE BAYESIAN METHOD
A. Problems in the Context of Disagreement Among Experts
Although we have seen that the Bayesian method is in many
ways a more transparent decision rule that may provide guidance in
judging the validity of two rival scientific hypotheses, a number of
perverse situations can arise when groups adopt significantly different
prior beliefs about the risks associated with an environmental harm.
This is an issue of particular concern with regard to implementation
of the Precautionary Principle, since debate over the risks of a number of environmental harms have often been characterized by an increasing divergence of opinion among experts, even as more data has
come to light.87 Intuitively, one might think that the beliefs of two
groups in disagreement would tend to converge as they are exposed
to a common set of data—one might even take increasing disagreement as evidence of some hidden or undiscovered motives on the part
of the experts. But when two groups adopt inappropriately extreme
initial positions, exposure to a common set of data may well increase
disagreement just because of the manner in which they rationally assimilate the new information under a Bayesian framework, aside from
hidden motive. The transparency required in a choice of prior beliefs
might go a long way towards mitigating bad-faith adoption of extreme
priors to manipulate outcomes. However, Bayesian techniques do
have the potential for creating some bizarre outcomes even when two
groups disagree in good faith.
For an example of this somewhat perverse Bayesian phenomenon, assume that two groups, Z and Y, initially adopt sharply divergent prior beliefs about the magnitude or probability of an environmental harm, X. Both groups’ prior beliefs can be represented by the
88
familiar, bell-shaped curve of a normal probability distribution.

87. The phenomenon of increasing divergence of positions during negotiations has also
been attributed to internal group dynamics, the assumption being that members of a group with
a particular ideological disposition embolden one another to adopt even more extreme positions
when they engage in dialogue with other members of the group. As this section suggests, however, even formal Bayesian approaches might not be adequate in countering this phenomenon.
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE LAW OF GROUP POLARIZATION, JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER NO. 91, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL (1999).
88. Bayesian statistics may extend to the more general area of negotiations among sophisticated actors. This is especially true considering that such discussions are frequently conducted
with the assistance of policy advisors employing formal quantitative modeling techniques.
Rather than offering a loosely heuristic view of how rational actors might act under very par-
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Group Z has a normal prior distribution with mean m and standard
deviation s. Let group Y have a normal prior distribution for X with
mean m´ and standard deviation s.
Both Z and Y are then exposed to a common set of data that lies
exactly between their prior beliefs. The likelihood function for the
data is normal with mean n and standard deviation t, with the condition that t is assumed to be known.
When exposed to information characterized by such a likelihood
function, group A’s posterior belief distribution will have mean89
2

2

2

2 90

[m/s + n/t ] / [1/s + 1/t ]

with variance
2

2

[1/s + 1/t ].

91

Group B will have a posterior mean of
2

2

m´[1/s + 1/t ]
92

with the same variance as group A.
Intuitively, one might think that the data will cause the two
groups’ posterior belief functions to creep closer together, thereby
promoting a degree of consensus.
However, Z and Y actually disagree more vigorously than before
because although the mean values of the belief distributions moved
closer together after exposure to new information, the functions simultaneously became “tighter” thereby increasing the degree of confidence of each group in their own beliefs. So, even though the mean
value of a group’s posterior belief function will be closer to the true
value after exposure to good information, the increased “tightness” of
the group’s posterior beliefs might actually cause that decision-maker
to assign a lower probability to some region surrounding the true
value of X. In other words, the increased tightness of the function
mitigates the fact that the medians have moved closer together such

ticular conditions, Bayes’ Theorem might well describe negotiation dynamics as they actually
occur in areas such as international environmental disputes.
89. Equations and example provided in response to question presented to James K. Hammit in e-mail correspondence of 7/6/99.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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that, when all the dust settles, there is actually less overlap between
the two groups beliefs.
This result might not in itself be so unsettling, since eventually
the two groups’ belief functions will converge in a more meaningful
way as they are exposed to more information. The problem is that a
decision to pursue more information is dependent on the decisionmaker’s expected value of information, which in turn is sensitive to
the degree of confidence the decision-maker has in his beliefs. Generally there is an inverse relationship between the degree of confidence and the expected value of information: the more confident you
are, the less likely you are to think that more information will change
your beliefs. This can lead to the development of information
deadzones, in which a stalemate can persist even though additional
information would eventually resolve it.
If Z and Y were engaged in negotiations over a regulatory standard, this phenomenon could disrupt negotiations. If a group’s decision to continue negotiating is influenced only by the mean value of
their belief function, exposure to new information will probably lead
towards consensus. But it is not implausible to imagine that other
factors might influence the decision to continue negotiating.
1. The Standardized Difference in Means
One of these factors is the standardized difference in means between group Z and Y’s belief functions. Graphically, the standardized difference in means is represented by the area of overlap between the two groups’ probability distributions. If the standardized
difference in means decreases after exposure to new information, this
suggests that the region of values of X for which both groups assign a
positive probability is decreasing. It also means that it would become
93
increasingly surprising for the two groups to reach consensus.
The standardized difference in means is the difference in means
between the belief functions for groups Z and Y divided by the standard deviation of one of the distributions. To determine whether this
area of overlap has decreased after exposure to information, one
must determine whether the posterior standardized difference can exceed the prior standardized difference. Since the prior distributions
differ by

93. Surprising in the sense that each assigned a lower degree of probability to the values
which could lead to agreement.
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94

and the posteriors differ by
2

2

2 3/2

(2m/s ) / (1/s + 1/t ) ,

95

this can be the case in our example if the values of s and t are sufficiently large. As a numerical example, if t = s and n = 0 (with the data
centered midway between the two priors), the posterior standardized
difference will exceed the prior standardized difference if s is greater
than 23/4, which is approximately 1.68.96 Significantly, this result does
not depend on the values of m and m´, so the data need not be extreme. Each group interprets the data as confirming its own prior beliefs, with the result being that the area of overlap between the posterior beliefs decreases.
2. . . .And the Expected Value of Information
Of course, if information gathering were free there would be no
problems. The two groups would continue gathering information until all uncertainty was effectively eliminated. But information gathering is usually not free, and a large part of what influences the decisions of negotiators to continue a dialogue is the relative costs and
benefits of gathering more information in hopes of overcoming a factual disagreement.97
Decision theorists formalize the expected benefits of further data
gathering by using the expected value of information. In assigning a
number to the value of more information, decision theorists ask two
distinct questions. First, how is more data likely to affect my belief
function? Second, what will be the increase in value I am likely to realize if I alter my decision in a way consistent with my expected new
98
beliefs?
In our example, the problems with this approach are self-evident.
Both groups have been exposed to data that from an objective per94. Hammit, supra note 89.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. One substantial cost, for example, is the risks associated with inaction while further research is conducted. See Adam M. Finkel & John S. Evans, Evaluating the Benefits of Uncertainty Reduction in Environmental Health Risk Management, 37 J AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
ASSN 1164 (1987); GRANGER M. MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO
DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1991).
98. See James K. Hammitt & Alexander I. Shlyakhter, The Expected Value of Information
and the Probability of Surprise, 19 RISK ANALYSIS, 135 (Feb. 1999).
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spective seems like it should disconfirm their prior beliefs. After all,
the data is centered midway between their prior belief functions; one
might think that they would realize that they have adopted inappropriately extreme positions. From a purely intuitive perspective, one
would think that this would lead them to be more open to questioning
their prior beliefs.
As we have seen, however, it is entirely possible that the groups
will both become more rigid in the sense that they will have “tighter”
belief functions. Both groups become even more confident in their
posterior beliefs if they assimilate the information in a way consistent
with Bayes’ Theorem. From their own subjective viewpoint, however, this is the most rational way for them to behave.
But such overconfidence dramatically decreases the chances that
99
they will pursue further information gathering. By adopting posterior belief functions in which too little probability is assigned to outcomes further away from the center of the probability distribution, a
negotiator will believe that it is unlikely that more information will
dramatically alter his beliefs. Because he believes that it is unlikely
that more information will change his beliefs, he will also tend to underestimate the extent to which more information gathering will alter
his decisions. Since he believes that more information gathering will
only further confirm his current beliefs, he will dramatically underestimate the value of more information gathering.
The extent to which such overconfidence affects an actor’s expected value of information is a complicated question that depends
on a number of factors, but work by prominent decision theorists suggests that even a small degree of overconfidence can lead people to
100
If
dramatically underestimate the expected value of information.
negotiators underestimate the value of further information gathering
when there is a factual dispute, it becomes less likely that they will
pursue the dialogue in hopes of resolving the question. They are far
more likely to agree to disagree, and the negotiations will end in a
stalemate.

99. Cf. Bruce L. Beron, Litigation Risk Management Analysis: A Comprehensive, Logical
Approach to Litigation Decision-Making in LITIGATION RISK ASSESSMENT FOR INSURANCE
COUNSEL 1996, at 27, 34 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, handbook Series No. 550 1996).
If our expert on a particular question has had much experience in similar cases, we would naturally be more confident of the resulting probabilities and would not feel compelled to research
the topic more thoroughly.
100. Hammitt & Shlyakhter, supra note 98.
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At this point, it becomes apparent how the interplay of factors
can lead to such stalemates. Two groups begin with widely divergent
prior beliefs, and are exposed to a little information. From an objective “bird’s eye” perspective, it seems like the data lies midway between their beliefs and should open them up to questioning their existing beliefs and engaging in further negotiations. From a subjective
perspective, however, the data can cause them to become even more
confident in their posterior beliefs. They will also “disagree” more in
the sense that they will have less overlap in their belief functions. Finally, their overconfidence will make them less likely to gather more
information in the hopes of overcoming any disagreement. Stalemate.
In all likelihood, the best method of overcoming such problems
would be to provide a systematic bias in favor of more information
gathering when two regulatory agencies are in disagreement over the
extent of an environmental harm. This could be accomplished
through a number of legal devices, such as a heightened burden of
persuasion for the party in the best position to conduct further research and information gathering in disputes over application of the
Precautionary Principle. It would be hoped, however, that the very
use of Bayesian methods would discourage regulators and their experts from adopting inappropriately extreme prior distributions. If
they were to do so, however, Bayesian techniques at least make explicit the assumptions that go into a choice of prior.
Such outcomes might suggest that Bayesian decision-making,
with its emphasis on subjective beliefs, might not be a helpful decision
tool used in isolation when groups of experts from different disciplines, for example, hold dramatically different beliefs about the
probability of an environmental harm. The problem might be most
acute in the international context, where coordination among nations
is often necessary for effective regulation. The fact that Bayesians
must explicitly adopt prior beliefs might discourage bad-faith posturing, but good-faith disagreement might be difficult to overcome if two
groups begin with radically different positions. Any systematic bias in
favor of more information gathering holds the potential for wasting of
resources. Moreover, when further information gathering takes the
form of observing the effects of an environmental threat, might lead
to dangerous delays in regulation.

CHAREST.DOC

09/11/02 1:15 PM

Spring 2002]BAYESIAN APPROACHES TO PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

291

IV. CONCLUSION
In adopting environmental regulations under conditions of true
scientific uncertainty, many advocates of the Precautionary Principle
have suggested that the use of Bayesian methods to assess probability
distributions may be inappropriate. But as this paper demonstrates,
even in cases of true uncertainty the Bayesian approach has characteristics that make it a more appropriate means of assessing even
truly uncertain risks than its methodological rivals. Bayesian techniques are more transparent than classical hypothesis testing, and are
consistent with well-established scientific principles such as falsifiability and simplicity when used to compare rival scientific hypotheses. Although Bayesian techniques can lead to perverse results when
groups adopt inappropriately extreme prior assessments of risk, such
problems can be discouraged through institutional innovations.
Moreover, the Bayesian requirement that regulators adopt an explicit
prior subjective distribution for an environmental risk subjects regulatory judgment to scrutiny through subsequent experience, making the
choice of “doctored” priors chosen to influence or defend policy or
trade decisions less likely. Its transparency and consistency with wellestablished scientific principles such as simplicity and falsifiability
demonstrate that the Bayesian approach possesses many attributes
that make it an appealing risk assessment tool in operationalizing the
sometimes controversial ideas behind the Precautionary Principal.

